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Parallel Antitrust Investigations: The Long
Arm of the DOJ from the Perspective of an
E.U. Defense Counsel
Roderick Lambert*
I. Parallel Investigations
The main emphasis of this paper is upon practical aspects of
parallel cartel investigations by the United States and the European
Union antitrust authorities. The current debate on the role of portfolio
theory in cross-jurisdictional merger cases is a matter of particular
concern in the U.S., given the European Commission's
("Commission") decision to block the proposed GE/Honeywell
merger.1 Ironically, this dispute is one of the very few cases where
the respective authorities in E.U. and the U.S. have reached opposite
conclusions. In the field of merger control, there has been successful
cooperation in the past, as demonstrated by the WorldCom/MCI and
the BT/AT&T/Japan Telecom cases,2 and in the field of antitrust
enforcement, the U.S. and E.U. regulators have developed a close
working relationship.
The campaign against international cartel activities is now on
the agenda of a myriad of international organizations. The United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the World Trade
Organization, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development ("OECD"), and the recently launched International
Competition Network are all examples of bodies with a dedicated
* Roderick Lambert is a Partner and Joint Head of Antitrust Litigation at the
European law firm Eversheds.
1 Case COMP/M2220, General Electric/Honeywell, 2001 O.J. C 46/6. The
Commission found that the notified concentration could fall within the scope of
Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89, but reserved final decision on the matter.
2 Case 99/287/EC, WorldCom/MCI, 1999 O.J. (L 116) 1-35; Commission
Decision declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market, Case
COMP/M. 15 10, AT&T/BT/Japan Telecom 1999 O.J. C 181/14.
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interest in the field. To those outside of the U.S., the International
Competition Policy Advisory Committee ("ICPAC") report considers
the global problem of enforcement, and, in effect, reads as if
addressed to all antitrust authorities rather than just the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice.3
There is now extensive cooperation between antitrust
authorities who attend regular meetings, at which they concentrate on
the multilateral convergence of enforcement policies. In Europe, for
example, the Commission is proposing a series of modernization
reforms, which will allow it to focus its efforts upon cartel detection
and prevention. These reforms will free up resources by removing the
system of mandatory notification of restrictive agreements, as well as
by removing the current monopoly, in relation to the grant of
exemptions from Article 81. 5 This freed up resource can then be
directed towards cartel detection and antitrust enforcement. The
Commission currently proposes an extension of its information-
gathering powers and wider questioning powers. The Commission
also seeks the authority to impose more significant fines in
circumstances where it finds that there has been some obstruction of
its investigation (currently a mere 5,000 euros.)
In the U.K., the proposals for reform are even more radical.
The Enterprise Bill will be introduced in 2002 and will include a new
criminal offense for individuals who engage in significant cartel
activity. The precise wording of the offense has yet to be confirmed,
but most likely, the offense will be independent of any finding of an
Article 81 infringement and will focus on "dishonest" involvement in
cartel activity as defined by the OECD. This proposition suggests that
ignorance of the law may be a defense, which would be a novel
proposition in U.K. criminal law. It is currently envisaged that
conviction will lead to custodial sentences of between 3 and 5 years,
which is similar to other jurisdictions such as Canada. There are
proposals in the soon to be revived Criminal Justice and Police Bill
that allow for covert surveillance and the disclosure of confidential
business information to overseas antitrust authorities for criminal
3 International Competition Policy Advisory Committee Report, at 18 (2000).
4 E.g., International Cartel Workshop held at Brighton, U.K., Nov. 2000 and
Ottawa, Canada, Nov. 2001. Information regarding this Workshop is available at
http://www.oft.gov.uk/html/trading/ftr29-03.htm. (last visited on Feb. 8, 2002).
5 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the implementation of the rules of
competition set forth in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty and amending Regulations
(EEC) No. 1017/68, (EEC) No. 2988/74, (EEC) No. 4056/86, and (EEC) No.
3975/87, COM (00) 582, final at 284-85.
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investigations or proceedings abroad.6
Additionally, high level international meetings now regularly
take place on antitrust policy. For example, the European
Competition Commissioner Mario Monti met with Charles James, the
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust and the Chairman of the
Federal Trade Commission, in Washington on September 24, 2001.
Increasingly global antitrust authorities are looking to invoke
jurisdiction on the basis of an anti-competitive effect within their
domestic territories. For instance, since the enactment of the U.K.
Competition Act on March 1, 2000, the Office of Fair Trading in the
U.K. has had the power to investigate all parties involved in anti-
competitive agreements, regardless of whether a company has
business premises in the U.K. The Office of Fair Trading must prove,
however, that the parties implemented the agreement in the U.K.
Similarly, in the E.U., with regard to jurisdiction under
Article 81, it is irrelevant whether or not the firms involved in the
cartel have their seats inside or outside the E.U.; rather, the issue is
whether an effect is felt within the E.U. Where there are subsidiary
companies operating without any real autonomy, it is irrelevant under
E.U. law that the parent company is situated in a territory outside the
E.U. Any acts that have an immediate, substantial, and foreseeable
effect within the E.U. will give the Commission jurisdiction to apply
Article 81 to international cartels that produce such effects on the
market.8
In addition to this expansive effects-based reasoning
regarding jurisdiction, antitrust authorities also rely upon the
international law notion of positive comity (for example, the 1998
E.U.-U.S. positive comity agreement). 9 This doctrine allows an
adversely affected state to appeal to other states to take steps against
businesses even if no offenses have been committed in that foreign
territory.
6 The White Paper, Productivity and Enterprise: A World Class Competition
Regime, Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry,
Department of Trade and Industry (July 2001) [hereinafter Productivity]; see also
Proposed Criminalisation of Cartels in the U.K., Sir Anthony Hammond KCB QC
and Roy Penrose OBE QPM, Office of Fair Trading, at 25 (Nov. 2001).
7 Competition Act, 1998, Chapter 41 (U.K.).
8 Case T-102/96, Gencor Ltd. v. Comm'n of the European Cmtys., 1999
E.C.R. 11-753, 4 C.M.L.R. 971 (1999).
9 Agreement between the E.C. & U.S. on the application of positive comity
principles in the enforcement of their competition laws, 1998 O.J. (L 173) 28, 30
[hereinafter Comity Agreement].
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Moreover, the aggressive investigation and fining policy of
the Department of Justice (with over six $100 million plus fines
already imposed) is now being mirrored by the European
Commission who, in 2001, issued 12 price-fixing decisions with the
fines imposed totaling 1.940 million euros.10
Notwithstanding the importance to the world economy of
eradicating international cartel behavior, it is nevertheless important
to highlight the need for this task to be accomplished in a manner
consistent with the protection of the fundamental human rights of
those suspected of cartel involvement. This task must also be
completed in a manner consistent with procedural fairness, a
fundamental principle of E.U. law.
In this context, antitrust authorities outside the U.S. should
welcome the recent decision in Kruman v. Christie's International."I
The plaintiff's complaint related to acts outside the U.S. and, from an
E.U. perspective, the court correctly commented that a finding of
jurisdiction in the U.S. would have been an unwarranted assertion of
U.S. judicial power.12 Similarly, in Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap v.
Heeremac VOF, 13 the court rejected the claims of a foreign plaintiff
injured in the foreign marketplace and confirmed that for the
Sherman Act to apply, a substantial effect on U.S. commerce itself
must give rise to any antitrust claim. A number of future cases are in
the pipeline, and hopefully, the more conservative view on the scope
of the Sherman Act outlined above will prevail. If the U.S. courts
permit forum-shopping by foreign entities where the dispute has little
causal connection with the U.S., then that can only operate to the
detriment of other antitrust enforcement systems which may take a
different view on matters such as treble damages and contingency
fees. A private litigation-based system is not the only plausible
system of ensuring compliance with the goals of the antitrust laws.
The references below to parallel investigations should be
taken as referring to concurrent, rather than anything as precise as
simultaneous, investigations.
10 For further details, please see Appendix A below.
11 129 F. Supp. 2d 620, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
12 Id.
13 241 F.3d 420, 429 (5th Cir. 2001).
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II. Subpoena
From an E.U. perspective, the breadth of a grand jury
subpoena in a Sherman Act proceeding is truly breathtaking. While
no doubt a product of the word-processor age, one cannot help but
think that such an overly expansive approach offends the
fundamental principles of fairness and is liable to lead to an
unfocused inquiry. Such breadth can only be explained by either a
failure to properly define the extent of the exercise at the outset, or
else it is an unwarranted fishing expedition that ought to be
condemned. The definitions of documents and subject matter covered
are invariably exhaustive. One grand jury subpoena has, in my
experience, actually covered every single document (electronic or
otherwise) in the possession of a corporate defendant. In other
instances, requests for documents have related to a period of 10
years, while in other cases, whole categories of information have
been sought without any time limitation.
At first glance, it seems of doubtful constitutional legitimacy
to exercise such draconian powers in so broad a manner. The
management time and legal costs involved in responding to requests
of this nature could be oppressive. In the E.U., there is no recognized
procedure for negotiating the scope of an Article 11 request for
information. These requests, however, are a good deal more narrowly
defined than their grand jury equivalent.
The U.K. Office of Fair Trading (the equivalent of the
Department of Justice) has power under Section 26 of the U.K.
Competition Act of 1998 to request categories of documents. A
recent request involved requiring the recipient to download 25
gigabytes of computer stored information. This exercise necessitated
the downloading and analyzing of around 3 million e-mails. The U.K.
Office of Fair Trading has now agreed to a procedure that will narrow
the scope of the Section 26 request before it attempts a response. It is
detrimental to the investigation system to require investigators,
lawyers, and other advisors, such as expert economists to examine a
vast number of irrelevant documents.
Furthermore, there must be some consistency with other
search procedures in criminal cases or quasi-criminal cases. In the
U.K., if a search warrant in a general criminal matter is to be
obtained, it is imperative that the suspected offense is quite clearly
delineated. The judiciary generally refuses to issue wide ranging
warrants. In the U.K., the area in which warrants issued under
Section 28 of the Competition Act 1998 are most likely to be
challenged in court is where they have been too widely drawn.
5132002]
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III. Protection of Attorney-Client Privilege
The protection of legally privileged documents is one of the
most important functions that the defense counsel in attendance at a
dawn raid investigation can undertake in the context of an
investigation by the antitrust authorities. One example is described in
detail below.
The Department of Justice, through grand jury proceedings in
the U.S., commenced a recent investigation of an E.U.-based
corporation. Using its powers under Regulation 17, the European
Commission subsequently raided the corporation.' i It was not
disputed that the European Commission had conducted the raid
essentially at the insistence and request of the Department of Justice
under the 1998 Positive Comity Agreement. The Commission
investigators demanded that attorney-client correspondence regarding
the U.S. investigation be handed over and threatened corporation
officers and external defense counsel with obstruction proceedings
when they refused to hand over such documents. The corporation
refused to hand over the correspondence because it saw no bar upon
such information finding its way into the hands of the Department of
Justice, whether by formal or informal procedures. Additionally,
there was a clear risk that this material could have ended up being
used to jeopardize the defendant's position in the U.S. criminal
proceedings. The Commission and the Office of Fair Trading's legal
officers both threatened to seek a High Court warrant to require
delivery of the documents in circumstances where obstruction would
have then constituted a criminal offense itself and contempt of court.
The defense counsel, citing human rights legislation, refused to hand
over the documents.
The Commission argued that the only material subject to legal
privilege under E.U. law was as defined by AM&S v. Commission.
15
This Court of Justice decision confirmed that only communications
from external legal advisors, and not in-house counsel, were covered
by legal privilege.' Strictly, the Court did no more in that case than
confirm that legal advice tendered by legal practitioners qualified to
practice within the European Community was subject to the
14 Article 14 EEC Council Regulation 17 First Regulation implementing
Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, 1962 J.O. (013) 0204.
15 Case 155/79, AM&S Europe Ltd. v. Comm'n of the European Cmtys., 1982
E.C.R. 1616.
16 id.
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protection of legal privilege.' 7
The defense counsel argued, however, that in circumstances
where parallel investigations were taking place, documents recording
legal advice tendered to U.S. lawyers relating to the conduct and
strategy to be adopted in U.S. proceedings must, as a matter of both
European and U.K. law, be covered by the doctrine of legal
professional privilege. The AM&S case was not apt to cover the
factual circumstances, in that there was no question in that case of
there being a parallel investigation by another antitrust authority. The
AM&S decision also pre-dated significant developments in the
protection of human rights at both the European and U.K. levels.
It was successfully advanced that the requirement to hand
over communications from U.S. lawyers instructed specifically to
advise on the U.S. investigation infringed upon the corporation's
rights under Article 6 and/or Article 8 read in conjunction with
Article 18 of the European Convention of Human Rights, the U.K.
Human Rights Act, and the client's fundamental rights under
European Community Law. Quite clearly, however, the protection
outlined in the AM&S case is no longer sufficient. It is noteworthy
that the U.S. counsel, who are qualified to practice in the European
Union, would be able to take advantage of privilege rules in
circumstances where fellow counsel, who are not qualified in Europe,
would not have that benefit.
This case highlights the importance of a coordinated defense
strategy where the procedural impropriety in the E.U. investigation
could no doubt have provided a 14th Amendment due process
argument for defense counsel in the U.S. proceedings.
IV. Confidentiality
At first sight, the confidentiality protection under E.U. law
seems quite strong. The Commission treats business secrets as
information that firms keep secret in order to prevent third parties
from obtaining an insight into the essential interests and operational
development of their business. To date, the list includes methods of
assessing manufacturing and distribution costs, production secrets
and processes, supply sources, quantities produced and sold, market
shares, customer and distributor lists, marketing plants, costs, price
structure, sales policy, and information on the internal organization of
17 Id.
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the firm. 18
This fairly expansive list, however, is subject to a major
caveat - business secrets are no longer protected when they are
known outside the firm to which they relate, if owing to the passage
of time, or for any other reason they are no longer commercially
important. In practice, the Commission has placed heavy reliance in
conducting its investigations on the argument that material can be no
longer commercially important in circumstances, where the
companies subject to investigation might take a different view.
Antitrust authorities often comment that the restrictions on
dealing with confidential information in formal agreements between
the E.U. and U.S. is a source of concern that prevents information
being routinely exchanged through these formal channels. In practice,
the European Commission does not seek formal waivers, as required
under the 1991 agreement.
When conducting dawn raids, the Commission refuses to
allow documents to be stamped as confidential and takes a very
narrow approach to any subsequent claim for confidentiality. In
circumstances where the Commission provides no undertaking
regarding confidentiality, the only course of action available for the
defense counsel would be to refuse to hand over material and suffer
the threat of obstruction proceedings. Furthermore, it is instructive in
this context to note that the ICPAC report in Annex 1C acknowledges
that the Antitrust Division now prefers to use informal procedures
rather than requests under formal treaty arrangements.
The protection of confidential information is an obvious
concern to European businesses in light of a defendant's
constitutional rights, under Brady v. Maryland, to have access to all
information relied on by the prosecuting authorities.' 9 The law on
access to information is not nearly as well developed in either Europe
or in the U.K., where there generally are no entrenched constitutional
rights that can be relied upon to back up a claim for access to
information.
There is anecdotal evidence in the U.K. regarding confidential
information, obtained in the context of a merger investigation, which
found its way into an Oregon newspaper notwithstanding its
confidential nature. U.K. organizations such as the Confederation of
British Industry remain very concerned by the limited ability to
18 Case 53/85, Akzo v. Comm'n of the European Cmtys., 1965 E.C.R. (1986);
Cases 142 and 156/84, B.A.T. and Reynolds v. Comm'n of the European Cmtys.,
4487 E.C.R. (1987).
'9 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
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protect confidential information once into the U.S. system.
Where the act of stamping photocopies of documents seized
in dawn raids can be done in a manner which does not alter or
obliterate any of the evidence, it is difficult to see why such a request
should be objectionable to antitrust authorities such as the
Commission. A simple step of that nature would certainly provide
some protection for the owner of the information and would place on
notice any third party coming into possession of the information in
the event of either unauthorized or accidental disclosure.
Additionally, this practice may also lay the foundation for a civil
claim for damages for breach of confidence.
V. Information Exchange
Formal provisions for the exchange of information exist
between the E.U. and the U.S. in terms of the 1991 Agreement and
the 1998 Positive Comity Agreement.2 ° It is possible, however, for
entities to exchange information through direct participation in each
other's proceedings. The Federal Trade Commission, for example,
attended the Commission's oral hearings in the British Oxygen
Company/Air Liquide case, and there would seem to be no reason
why such an arrangement could not be extended to Regulation 17
procedure in cartel cases. 21 Article 19 of Regulation 17 provides that
the Commission or the competent authorities of the member states
may also hear "other natural or legal persons" and that "applications
to be heard on the part of such persons shall, where they show a
sufficient interest, be granted."
Furthermore, there is regular exchange of information both on
an informal basis and through the secondment of officials. Clearly,
the International Competition Network is designed to facilitate the
further exchange of information and this must be seen in the context
of the international nature of much of modem day cartel activity.
It is possible to discern a change in emphasis away from
formal antitrust cooperation agreements toward the use of the Mutual
Legal Assistance Treaties ("MLATs") in criminal matters. By way of
example, the U.S. and U.K. signed a MLAT on January 6, 1995,
which was ratified on December 2, 1996. This instrument formalized
20 Comity Agreement, supra note 9; Agreement between the E.C. & U.S.
regarding the application of their competition laws, 1995 O.J. L 132.
21 See generally Case COMP/M.1630, Air Liquide/BOC (Commission
Decision of Jan. 18, 2000 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the
common market according to Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89).
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cooperation between the two countries and covers the taking of
witness statements, the provision of documents, the transfer of
prisoners to give evidence, requests to search and seize property, and
procedures in respect of the tracing, freezing, and forfeiting of the
proceeds of serious crime.
The Treaty specifically excluded antitrust or competition
investigations. Without any prior consultation, however, (or, for that
matter, consideration by any legislative body), an exchange of letters
took place on April 29, 2000 and May 1, 2000 whereby the carve-out
in relation to antitrust or competition investigations was withdrawn.
22
Given that this transpired in circumstances where there is, as yet, no
criminal offense in the U.K., it is difficult to understand this
amendment as giving rise to any reciprocal benefits in the U.K.
It is also highly questionable under E.U. law for one member
state to have entered into a bilateral competition law enforcement
arrangement with a non-E.U. member state where there are already
common rules at the E.U. level in the form of the 1991 and 1998
agreements.
It is instructive that the Annex to the ICPAC report notes that
the Antitrust Division reports "positive experiences" using MLATs
(Canada is often cited as an example). It seems that details,
however, are not publicly available under these mechanisms, which
has added to the concern regarding the removal of the carve-out from
an E.U. perspective. This point is given additional force by the fact
that as a matter of law, U.S authorities cannot presently guarantee
that information received by them will be kept out of the public
domain or that it will be used only for the purposes for which it has
been passed to them. European business organizations such as the
CBI have voiced particular concerns given their belief that in the
past, antitrust laws have been used for political and commercial
purposes to benefit U.S. companies at home and abroad at the
expense of European competitors.
While criminal sanctions are planned in the U.K.,24 the
current position is that antitrust infringement is not yet (and indeed
may never become) a criminal matter in the U.K. Moreover, antitrust
infringement is never likely to be a criminal matter in the E.U. given
22 See generally http://www.dti.gov.uk./cp (last visited on Feb. 8, 2002).
23 International Competition Policy Advisory Committee Final Report (Feb.
2000), Annex l-C, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/icpac.htm (last
visited Feb. 8, 2002).
24 See generally Productivity, supra note 6.
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the constitutional problems the Commission would face in trying to
establish general jurisdiction over criminal matters. The MLAT
mechanism has little real transparency or accountability and this
seems objectionable on first principles given the nature of the powers
being exercised.
Finally, on the issue of confidentiality, the Office of Fair
Trading has stated that under MLAT mechanisms, it will not
exchange information obtained under the U.K. leniency (amnesty)
program. This is, however, merely current working practice, which
has no formal legal status.
VI. Global Defense Strategy
When advising a modem international business on
contentious antitrust issues, defense counsel must consider a number
of different antitrust authorities in Australia, Canada, New Zealand,
and Latin America, in addition to the E.U. and the U.S. authorities.
Clearly, defense counsel need to be aware of the possibility
for multi-jurisdictional procedural and human rights challenges and
to be aware of the differences in substantive law. Not all price-fixing
cases under Article 81 are of the classic smoke-filled room variety
involving Archer Daniel Midland stereotypes. A number of cases
involve complex issues surrounding the sharing of cost-based
information, as well as some arguably pro-competitive benchmarking
exercises. Article 81 is of wider ambit than Section 1 of the Sherman
Act and can catch conduct, which involves a lesser degree of
culpability than its U.S. counterpart.
While the U.K. has plans to introduce criminal sanctions for
hardcore cartel activity, these plans may yet fall foul of E.U. law. The
Court of Justice has emphasized that Article 81 is not the same as the
Sherman Act in that there are no per se violations in theory within
Article 81.
Significantly, the European Commission, as an administrative
body, frequently requests competitors to collude together regarding
standards, testing and environmental matters. When compared to the
Department of Justice, the Commission clearly has a much broader
administrative role in antitrust matters (for example through the
granting of exemptions under Article 81(3) and the promulgation of
Notices and Guidelines on, for example, the block exemptions to
Article 81).
Defense counsel also must appreciate the differences in the
approach of the respective enforcement agencies. There is a clear
trend in the U.S. towards the prosecution of foreign corporate and
2002] 519
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individual defendants. There is undoubtedly a political component to
that strategy. In one parallel investigation case, the Department of
Justice characterized a major U.S. corporation as being in a vertical
relationship with those suspected of involvement in a price-fixing
cartel. Alternatively, it would have been impossible under E.U. law
for that U.S. corporation to be characterized as being in anything
other than a straightforward horizontal relationship.
In contrast, the European Commission has concentrated its
efforts on persistent European corporate offenders and certain
specific sectors, particularly chemicals, automotive, glass, and steel.
The forthcoming changes in the systems in the U.K. and the
E.U. will give rise to certain anomalies. The larger pan-European
cartels will fall within the jurisdiction of the European Commission,
where there will be only corporate financial penalties and no criminal
sanctions for guilty individuals. If, however, an individual is
implicated in smaller, purely U.K.-based cartels (with logically a
lesser effect on commerce), under the proposed criminal regime, that
individual will be facing the possibility of a 3 to 5 year prison
sentence.
On a procedural level, U.S.-style joint defense agreements are
unlikely to develop in the E.U. Some of the information exchange
obligations in typical U.S. agreements involve significant constraints
upon a defendant's freedom of action and concerns will remain
regarding the compatibility of such agreements with wider
professional obligations.
Perhaps the most significant procedural issue for defense
counsel going forward will be the ramifications posed by the various
amnesty and leniency programs. The system in the U.S. works well
because of the ability to formally plea bargain. This procedure is
presently impossible on constitutional grounds in the U.K. The
current proposals for criminalization will potentially cause significant
damage to the U.K. leniency policy in that no guarantee of immunity
from prosecution can be given. This disrupts the essential prisoner's
dilemma matrix behind all effective amnesty/leniency programs.
The E.U. leniency program is currently under review.25 The
present procedure is extremely unsatisfactory in that it is inherently
subjective (requiring the production of "decisive evidence" of cartel
involvement), no immunity can be granted up front, and significant
uncertainty as to the scope and extent of any eventual immunity from
25 Commission Notice on the non-imposition for reduction of fines in cartel
cases, 1996 O.J. (C 207) 4; Draft Commission notice on immunity from fines and
reduction of fines in cartel cases, 2001 O.J. (C 205) 18.
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fines remains throughout the process. It is also currently the case that
only a maximum 75% reduction in fine can be given once an
investigation has begun and this is unattractive when compared with
the U.K. and U.S. regimes. Given the size of the Commission fines,
even the possibility of having to pay 25% of the fine is likely to
discourage companies from taking the initiative and approaching the
Commission. The decision to seek leniency is a process fraught with
difficulty due to conflict of interest problems between individuals and
the company, as well as within the Board where the incentives of, for
example, venture capitalist representatives, may differ from those of
other Directors.
One major issue for defense counsel will be the question of
which authorities to approach for leniency and when. The existence
of class actions, contingency fees, and the court's power to award
treble damages does not make the U.S. a particularly attractive
proposition when dealing with a pre-investigation application for
leniency. That stated, once an investigation is under way, the
certainty inherent in the U.S. amnesty program would have clear
procedural benefits over both the E.U. and (prospectively) the U.K.
regimes. The final decision on leniency will also require to factor in
the application of differing rules on limitation, locus standi, and
quantum of damages, which operate in the various civil jurisdictions
affected by the infringing conduct. There is yet to be a single reported
decision in the U.K. of a successful private action for damages for
breach of Article 81 or Article 82. One should not assume, however,
that the absence of a treble damages remedy in, for instance the U.K.,
means that the level of recovery is unlikely to justify the risks and
costs of private enforcement. In the U.K., the courts can award pre-
judgment interest on actual damages, but it cannot be assumed that
the U.K. courts will follow the Illinois Brick26 rule, which denies
locus standi to indirect purchasers, and perhaps most importantly,
exemplary or punitive damages may well be available in serious
cartel cases, such as the Vitamins case.
Finally, it will need to be borne in mind that one effect of
criminalization of hardcore cartel activity in the U.K. will be that
individuals will then be capable of being extradited to the U.S. (and
other countries with criminal regimes) under normal U.K. extradition
arrangements. 27
26 111. Brick v. State of IM., 431 U.S. 720, 735 (1977).
27 18 U.S.C.A. § 3181 (West 2000).
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Appendix A
EUROPEAN COMMISSION PRICE FIXING FINES IN 2001
Case Amount fined (6 million)
Carbonless paper 313.7 million
German banks 100.8 million
Zinc phosphate 11.95 million
Citric acid 135.22 million
Luxembourg brewers 448,000
Belgian brewers 91 million
Vitamins 855.22 million
Daimler Chrysler 71.825 million
Sodium Gluconate 57.53 million
Graphite electrodes 218.8 million
SAS/Maersk Air and Sun-Air; 39.375 million;
SAS and Maersk Air 13.125 million
Volkswagen 30.96 million
Total 1,940 million
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